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Such welcome and unwelcome things at once
1
‘Tis hard to reconcile.
To grant woman an equality with man in the affairs of life
is contrary to every tradition, every precedent, every
inheritance, every instinct, and every teaching. The
acceptance of this idea is possible only to those possessing
an especially progressive tendency and a strong sense of
justice, and it is yet too soon to expect these from the
2
majority.
I.

INTRODUCTION
3

Much has been written about the history of progressivism, its
4
varied and sometimes contradictory meanings, and the
5
6
7
philosophical, political, and legal movements identified as being
progressive. Although the term is ubiquitous in certain circles of
8
the American political left, it is not commonly used in the national
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 4, sc. 3.
2. 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE xiii–xxxiii (Susan B. Anthony & Ida
Husted Harper eds., 1902).
3. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (examining the rise of the
progressive movement and its challenge to social and economic inequality);
Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996)
(reviewing NEIL DUXBRY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
4. See ALAN FREEMAN, Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty,
Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 285 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
5. See, e.g., J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and
Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 542–54 (2004).
6. See Editorial, On the Move, THE NATION, June 26, 2006, at 3.
7. Robin L. West has contributed an immense amount of scholarship in this
area. See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS
OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003) [hereinafter WEST, REIMAGINING JUSTICE]; Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88
MICH. L. REV. 641, 678–79 (1990) [hereinafter West, Constitutionalism].
8. In particular, the people and groups who seek policies more leftist than
the current Democratic party is willing to prioritize often self-identify as
progressives. See, e.g., The American Prospect, History and Mission, http://www.
prospect.org/web/page.ww?name=About+Us&section=root (last visited Nov. 1,
2006) (“Our conservative counterparts have played a critical role in pulling the
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9

public policy discourse or the mainstream media.
Some
commentators question whether American progressivism has
10
ceased to exist in any significant way.
Without attempting to reconcile these rich areas of inquiry,
this article explores whether continuing progressive vitality is
revealed in the interpretation of one problematic aspect of sexual
harassment law in Minnesota. First, this article briefly identifies
what are usually considered progressive ideals and how those goals
have been translated into laws impacting sexuality, women’s rights,
11
and sexual harassment. Next, it explores what progressive should
mean in the context of a vital requirement in proving workplace
sexual harassment—that the complained-of conduct was
12
unwelcome.
Then, it analyzes the extent to which, in its
treatment of this area of the law, Minnesota fulfills its promise as a
13
progressive state.
II. PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION OF UNWELCOMENESS – WHAT
WOULD IT LOOK LIKE?
A. Defining “Progressive” Ideals, Goals, Laws
In general, progressive ideas, policies, and movements are
founded on the notion that society can be improved by moving
beyond established tradition. Progressive theories advocate trying
14
In
new ways to counteract social and economic inequality.
entire national debate to the right. We intend to take it back.”); Center for
American Progress, The Progressive Priorities Series, http://www.american
progress.org/projects/progressivepriorities/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (series of
papers promoting “progressive priorities” that include universal health insurance
and reducing payroll taxes in favor of restructured income taxes).
9. Rather, discussions of politics in the mainstream American media are
usually limited to the liberal-versus-conservative dichotomy.
10. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Is American Progressive Constitutionalism Dead?, 4
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. i, i (1999) (“[N]either the United States Congress nor the
Supreme Court has been decidedly progressive for at least twenty-five years, if ever
at all. . . . [T]he future appears unlikely to contain a truly progressive judiciary. . . .
Similarly, progressivism is no longer represented in the Congress, nor is it
anything but a forgotten voice in American constitutional and political culture.”).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B–C.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See, e.g., James M. Caponi, Can’t We Get Along?: Progressive Constitutionalism
and the Struggle for Existence and Understanding Within the New Federalism, 4 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. 429, 443 n.81 (1999) (citing West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 643
(noting that progressives view the Constitution as a mechanism for challenging
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response to the hierarchical effects of capitalism, progressives tend
to seek governmental standards to ensure a level of fairness and
equality that the unrestricted market cannot be relied upon to
15
provide.
From the progressive point of view, government is an
16
instrument of good.
Modern progressives seek governmental
action to construct social policies that provide power to the
17
The belief is that government
otherwise disenfranchised.
intervention ensures fairness for ordinary people against the power
18
of big business, entrenched interests, and the privileged classes.
As a result, economic policies considered progressive tend to favor
19
lower-status and lower-income persons.
But society cannot achieve such fairness without fundamental,
sometimes unsettling, change. Because the traditional social
structure is believed to preserve power in the established elite,
progressives favor efforts to disrupt the existing social hierarchy
20
Typically, these
and move toward the goal of social equality.
entrenched social and economic inequality)); Hill, supra note 5, at 547–48
(“[P]rogressives argue that total social freedom can be expanded by adjusting (or
equalizing) societal conditions to promote greater freedom of choice among
individuals.”); Michelle McGovern, A Progressive Perspective on Pronography [sic]:
American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 451, 470 (1999)
(quoting Justice Brandeis as advocating progressive social and economic
experimentation by state legislatures); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect
and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1101 (2004) (arguing that progressive
taxation justifiably redistributes wealth to reduce economic disparity).
15. Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/
aboutus (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (statement of purpose from the Center for
American Progress indicating, among other things, that making America a country
of boundless opportunity “will only be achieved with an open and effective
government that champions the common good over narrow self-interest,
harnesses the strength of our diversity and secures the rights and safety of its
people”)
16. J. LEONARD BATES, THE ORIGINS OF TEAPOT DOME: PROGRESSIVES, PARTIES,
AND PETROLEUM, 1909–1921 1 (1963).
17. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 678–79.
18. BATES, supra note 16, at 2.
19. For example, the IRS Glossary defines “progressive tax” as “[a] tax that
takes a larger percentage of income from high-income groups than from lowincome groups.” Internal Revenue Service, Glossary, http://www.irs.gov/app/
understandingTaxes/jsp/ tools_glossary.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2006). “Regressive
tax” is defined as “[a] tax that takes a larger percentage of income from lowincome groups than from high-income groups.” Id. For an in-depth discussion of
progressive tax policy, see Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal
State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005).
20. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 679.
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efforts have been focused on economic empowerment, with the
idea that those who perform the work of the society should be
21
entitled to receive the benefits of the society.
Justification for government-mandated social change is
grounded sometimes in the moral imperatives of justice and
22
equality.
Sociologist Fred Block cites the effort to inhibit the
unrestrained power of big business as one of the great popular
movements designed to connect economic and political institutions
23
with “our deepest moral commitments.” Block argues that to gain
support for their ideas in the current political climate, progressives
must develop a narrative describing a “moral economy,” where the
government moderates otherwise selfish individual goals to achieve
24
the objective of a moral society.
A brief comparison to general notions of conservative ideology
further clarifies our definition of progressive. One criticism of the
conservative political doctrine is that its adherence to tradition
25
inhibits the potential for positive change.
Conservatives trust
21. See William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and
Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence
Employer Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 17–18 (1989)
(describing progressive advocacy for workers compensation programs in the U.S.);
Molly S. Mcusic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1344–45 (1997) (listing progressive workplace reforms and
critiquing the implicit model of the universal white male worker, whose wife was
expected to work at home or serve as a second-class employee). For an example of
more recent progressive workplace reform efforts, see Scott L. Cummings,
Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement
for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 492–93 (2001) (advocating community
economic development through legal advocacy for living wage ordinances and
other policies that improve the economic conditions of low-income workers).
22. Some authors argue that a connection to religious-based moral
imperatives is required for progressives to impact social and political discourse.
Eric Alterman, With God on Our Side?, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2006, at 10.
“American progressive reform has never advanced without a moral awakening
entangled with notions about what the Lord would have us do.” Id. A discussion
of religious doctrine concerning the place of women in society and treatment of
sexuality is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
23. Fred Block, A Moral Economy: To Seize the Political Moment, Democrats Need a
Better Narrative, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2006, at 19.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Kevin Drum, Political Animal, WASH. MONTHLY, http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_03/003574.php (Mar. 29,
2004, 15:10 EST) (“Conservatives, almost by definition, are absorbed by the
past.”). Others argue that deference to tradition is good for democracy. GILBERT
K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 85 (1908) (“Tradition means giving votes to the most
obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition
refuses to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those who merely happen
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neither current political actors nor social consensus, rather they
advocate adherence to time-tested social and legal structures that
26
are immune from the whims of the majority. For conservatives,
the collective wisdom of generations is far more reliable and
27
desirable than the conclusion of any one modern individual. As
such, they seek to conserve the status quo in society and in the law
28
(or at least how they perceive it).
This means preserving the
institutions and social structures that generated the entrenched
29
principles they value.
From a conservative perspective, the value of law lies in its
ability to preserve the established social structure by means of rules
30
governing human behavior.
Conservative goals promoted by
regulating behavior might include promoting “public peace for the
31
benefit of the entire community.” Social rules enforced by law
support the institutions (fatherhood, maternity, inheritance) and
identities (fathers, children) that promote stability and
32
predictability of the past. By maintaining the social order through
direct reference to the past, the likelihood of upheaval and conflict
33
is seen as lessened.
Progressives, in contrast, seek laws that facilitate change from
existing tradition. They see conflict and upheaval as necessary risks
warranted by the benefits of a more just society. Law provides the
power to enable a society to move beyond the inertia of tradition,
moderating the selfish impulses of human behavior to improve the
conditions of the society overall.
Progressivism, however, shares some aspects of conservative
ideology.
Both conservatives and progressives believe that
government should create structures that promote (their view of)
34
an ideal society.
Both progressives and conservatives view the
to be walking about.”).
26. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 652–54.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 168 (describing the “moral
point” of law according to conservative jurisprudence).
31. Dana Neacsu, Tempest in a Teacup or the Mystique of Sexual Legal Discourse, 38
GONZ. L. REV. 601, 604 (2003).
32. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 167–68.
33. Neacsu, supra note 31, at 604 (identifying the promotion of “public peace
for the benefit of the entire community” as a goal of conservatives).
34. Frank Michelman, What (If Anything) is Progressive – Liberal Democratic
Constitutionalism?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 198–99 (1999).
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35

judiciary as incapable of neutrality. As a result, they share the
belief that judicial decisions based on the Constitution are
36
necessarily affected by the political process. Where conservatives
and progressives completely diverge is in their ultimate goals:
progressives seek state actions that upset the structure of social
hierarchy, while conservatives favor state actions that preserve
37
patterns derived from the established social structure.
1.

Sexuality

Whereas progressive efforts once focused on promoting
economic and social justice, the quest for this type of change has
38
resonated little with the general public during recent decades. As
a result, other goals have been moved to the progressive forefront.
At least one author has opined that “in a society in which the quest
for socio-economic equality has come to a halt, sexual equality
39
seems to represent the most progressive goal that one can reach.”
Progressive treatment of sexual issues seeks legal protection
for what many consider individual rights against government
40
regulation. These relatively recent developments in the law limit
government intrusion on personal choices regarding intercourse,
contraceptives, masturbation, abortion, and familial living
41
arrangements. It is argued that enlarging the areas in which the
government cannot impede sexual decision making promotes

35. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 644.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 679.
38. Neacsu, supra note 31, at 652–53.
39. Id. at 603. The author categorizes the opposing movements favoring legal
regulation of sexuality as “permissive individual rights” (progressive) and
“repressive legislation” (conservative). Id. at 613.
40. See id. at 603 (identifying the right to engage in contraceptively protected
intercourse with one’s spouse as among the “new individual rights with a sexual
content”).
41. See id., at 603 n.9 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (nonnuclear family living arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972) (nonprocreative
contraceptive nonmarital intercourse); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(masturbation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (nonprocreative
marital intercourse); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreative
marital intercourse); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (intercourse in
a secluded automobile)). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and
Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 640 (discussing the history and evolution of
the jurisprudence of sodomy laws in the United States).
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greater tolerance and a more democratic society.
Conversely,
efforts to restrict and regulate sexuality generally are considered
43
“conservative.” Laws that impose sexual abstinence, criminalize
obscenity, and restrain sexual expression fall on the anti44
progressive end of the scale.
2.

The Rights of Women

Legal developments that identified and protected individual
rights in the area of sexual autonomy are especially significant to
women, who have been subject to more cultural and governmental
intrusion than men. In the same progressive spirit, laws forbidding
gender discrimination are intended to create social change by
alleviating the unequal treatment of women in the workplace and
45
in society as a whole. Because traditional power structures have
46
marginalized and subordinated women,
society identifies
progressives as those who support policies and legislation that
47
promote women’s rights. The underlying theory is that the law
should play a role in reforming cultural biases that perpetuate
48
inequality. By imposing rules that aim to dismantle the effects of
social injustice and interpreting the law in a manner that refuses to
49
countenance harmful biases of the past, the law promotes justice.
42. Neacsu, supra note 31, at 603.
43. Id. at 604 (“Conservatives, on the other hand, have used sexually-oriented
legislation to create a chimera of social order and predictability.”).
44. Id. (cataloging such legislation as conservative).
45. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (stating that the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in
employment and “to place all men and women, regardless of race, color, religion,
or national origin, on equal footing in how they were treated in the workforce”).
46. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 116–18
(2005) (“No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the
social order under which women, as well as men, live.”).
47. See Rafael Chodos, Protecting the Righteous Employer Against Abusive Sexual
Harassment Claims: Two Modest Proposals, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 565, 573–74 (1995)
(describing Title VII as arising from progressive forces of the 1960s that sought to
end discrimination against women in the workplace through legislation). See also
Katha Politt, Regressive Progressive, THE NATION, May 27, 2002, at 10 (excoriating
then-Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich for being a much-touted progressive
candidate with an anti-progressive voting record on abortion rights).
48. See Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping With
Preconceptions Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559 (2002) (noting the enactment
of rules of evidence meant to overcome disfavored preconceptions).
49. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 693 (delineating progressive
constitutional interpretation of the equal protection clause as aimed at “correcting
maldistributions of social power, wealth, and prestige” and “a tool for dismantling
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50

Actual changes in social views are hoped to follow.
There is not, however, always a clear consensus on which laws
and underlying doctrine actually effect the desired social changes.
Some criticize the development of a legal equality doctrine that
begins with an assessment of whether or not the woman is “similarly
situated” to the man as a standard that permits continued
discrimination based upon socially perceived differences between
51
men and women. While legal treatment of women has improved,
many commentators argue that the law continues to validate
52
women’s subordination.
Similarly, efforts of the early Progressive Movement to improve
the status of women are viewed as causing contradictory effects.
Leaders pushed for enhancements of women’s legal rights,
including the right to vote and improvements in employment
53
opportunities.
While these advocates sought legislation
protecting both male and female workers from employer abuses,
they also tended to support special protections for female
54
employees.
Unfortunately, the creation of special laws that
society’s racist, misogynist, homophobic, patriarchic, and economic hierarchies”).
50. See Chodos, supra note 47, at 573–74 (noting that 1960s
antidiscrimination and affirmative action legislation were promoted by the notion
that “the results of bad attitudes,” i.e., workplace discrimination, “had to be
extirpated and that legislation was a good way to extirpate them”). Chodos, who
critiques sexual harassment law as unfair to employers, goes on to characterize the
era as “when the law began to subscribe enthusiastically to the notion that we can
raise the consciousness of offenders by lightening their pockets.” Id. at 574.
51. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the
Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David Kairys ed.,
rev. ed. 1990) (conceding that Equal Protection doctrine has made some progress
toward eliminating sex discrimination, but criticizing “the legal ideology of
equality” for legitimizing differential treatment).
52. Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 294, 297 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (“Over the past
century, the legal system has rejected some of its most blatant sexist notions and
expressions without ceasing to reinforce male power and female subordination.”).
53. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, LA FOLLETTE’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY; A
PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCES 311–18 (1913). La Follette gushed
over the intelligence of women in his family in an apparent effort to establish why
he believed women to be capable of providing wise counsel on political and legal
matters. Id. at 312–14. La Follette promoted increased participation of women in
public life by appointing them to state executive positions and supporting
women’s sufferage. Id. at 314–18.
54. Joan Hoff, Women and the Constitution, in THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION: 200 YEARS OF ANTI-FEDERALIST, ABOLITIONIST, FEMINIST,
MUCKRAKING, PROGRESSIVE, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIALIST CRITICISM 239–40 (Bertell
Ollman & Jonathan Birnbaum eds., 1990) (“Progressive women’s ideology and
goals are also difficult to appreciate today because they seem contradictory and
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applied only to women reinforced stereotypes that justified
discriminatory treatment of women, particularly in the workplace.
Another criticism of the movement for special protections is that it
disempowered women by reinforcing their traditional roles.
Implementation of such special protections connoted that women
55
were fragile, submissive, and in need of safeguarding.
The
justification for these protections placed an inordinate emphasis on
women’s capacities to reproduce, focusing on this essential aspect
of womanhood over any differences that individual women might
56
have. This rationale articulated motherhood as the primary role
57
of all women.
As a result, laws that effectively restricted women to lowerpaying, lower-prestige jobs were justified because of the
childbearing function that society assumed all women had.
Moreover, lawmakers used the physical demands of childbearing
and the relative frailty of women as a further basis for restricting
women in the workplace. They relied upon the demands of
motherhood without regard for whether individual women in fact
58
were or intended to become mothers. Lawmakers also assumed
ambiguous.
On the one hand, Progressive women explicitly committed
themselves to women’s rights – the right to equal political participation and to the
opportunity for meaningful, productive, and well-paid work. On the other hand,
the very same women successfully established legal constraints on women’s rights
in the work place.”).
55. Id. at 239 (stating that both the idea and the actuality of special legislation
for women workers “strengthened sexual segregation and stratification patterns in
the labor market . . . were based on the assumption that women would always be
cheap, temporary, unskilled labor . . . [and] helped define patterns of
discrimination against female wage-earners, limited women’s economic
opportunities, and reinforced stereotypic notions of women as frail, passive, and
dependent.”).
56. Id. See also, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 494 U.S. 1055 (1990) (upholding employer policy that all
women of childbearing age, regardless of whether they intended to have children,
were prohibited from employment in a battery manufacturing plant to protect
their potential fetuses from lead poisoning).
57. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 51, at 164–65 (describing the Supreme
Court’s upholding a statute that forbade employment of women for more than ten
hours per day in a laundry in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
58. The perception that all women are by default potential mothers has never
been eliminated. A recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report has
been characterized as urging today’s women to act like they are always pregnant,
regardless of whether they intend to become pregnant. January W. Payne, Forever
Pregnant Guideline: Treat Nearly All Women as Pre-Pregnant, WASH. POST, May 16,
2006, at F1. The report itself focused, among other things, on the need for health
insurance and health care to be made available to the lower-income and minority
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that women were weaker, without considering that some women
might be physically vigorous or that some men were less physically
capable than some women, thus “bolster[ing] a highly traditional
and restrictive definition of woman’s role in society generally as
59
well as in the workplace.”
Tensions between the goals, means, and effects of the laws
intended to alleviate gender inequity continue to be noted
throughout the legal terrain. Developments that some herald as
advancing women’s status in society are savaged by others. For
example, commentators disagree on the progressive nature or
social benefits of laws designed to facilitate equality by forbidding
60
61
discrimination,
regulating pornography,
or criminalizing
62
63
prostitution and statutory rape.
3.

Sexual Harassment Law

The relatively recent addition of sexual harassment law to the

women who are most in need of pre-pregnancy assistance and contraceptive
planning. Recommendations to Improve Preconception Health and Health Care – United
States, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention), Apr. 21, 2006 at 11, 13–14. These guidelines are troublesome in their
potential to be used to justify prosecution of women for engaging in conduct that
harms their fetuses. Moreover, the guidelines ignore the fact that not all women
are potential (biological) mothers, including those without fully functioning
reproductive systems and those who do not have sex with men.
59. Hoff, supra note 54, at 239.
60. For a summary of the feminist debate concerning formal equality versus
substantive equality, see Note, Feminist Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using
Statutory Rape Laws as an Illustration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1068–71 (1999).
61. See Dana A. Fraytak, The Influence of Pornography on Rape And Violence
Against Women: A Social Science Approach, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 274–75 (2001)
(outlining debate as to whether anti-pornography laws advance or undermine
women's rights and progressive causes); Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's
Liberation: Against Porn Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1994) (arguing that
efforts to suppress pornography enable censorship of progressive ideas and legal
restrictions on women's sexuality).
See also NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1st ed.
Scribner, 1995). [Editor’s Note: See Strossen’s article in this issue: Nadine
Strossen, “Is Minnesota Progressive?” A Focus on Sexually Oriented Expression, 33
WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 51 (2006).]
62. See Gregg Aronson, Note, Seeking a Consolidated Feminist Voice for Prostitution
in the US, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 357 (2006) (discussing three competing
schools of feminist thought concerning prostitution).
63. See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, Patriarchy
and the Potential for Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 803–07 (2001) (describing feminist advocacy for, and critique
against, statutory rape laws).
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gender equality arsenal has provoked similar debate. Sexual
harassment law was constructed using the anti-discrimination
framework to curb behaviors once seen as normal, natural, and
64
innocuous. These laws broke from traditional acceptance of this
65
type of discrimination by identifying new rights. The intent was
not so much to facilitate litigation or provide a remedy, as to
66
modify the ways in which people interacted in the workplace. The
creation of a government-sponsored ban on sexual harassment at
work provides an example of progressive regulation of selfish
67
impulses in order to improve conditions for society as a whole.
The laws protecting employees from having to endure sexual
harassment in the workplace represent a progressive effort to
empower two traditionally marginalized groups—employees, and,
in particular, women employees. In keeping with progressive
ideals, these laws impose the burden of taking steps to eliminate
68
such conduct upon employers.
Many commentators believe that, despite the failure to achieve
sexual equality in the workplace and in society, sexual harassment
69
law serves as an example of successful progressive advocacy.
Others argue, however, that conservatives co-opted sexual
harassment law to serve their goals of reinforcing women’s
70
subordination.
64. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 110–11 (1995)
(describing cases in the early 1970s where federal courts rejected efforts to
articulate sexual harassment claims as outside the scope of Title VII).
65. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that Title
VII provides employees the “right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”).
66. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that
Congress intended to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification”).
67. See Block, supra note 23, at 19.
68. See L. Robert Guenthner, III, Who is the Victim Here?: Vicarious Sexual
Harassment After Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 299, 302 n.12 (“The notion that employers are the ones best suited to
bear the costs of sexual harassment in the workplace, rather than the victim, is a
progressive social statement that tells employers they must do the right thing and
take proactive steps to limit and remove this problem from the workplace.”).
69. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 162–79.
70. Some commentators argue that sexual harassment law has gone too far in
seeking to eliminate harassment. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 782 (2006) (citing Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized
Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003)). See also Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong
with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) (arguing that Title VII
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B. Exemplifying “Regressive” – The Requirement of Unwelcome Conduct
The framework of sexual harassment law’s prima facie case
incorporates among its criteria that a complaining employee must
71
establish that the offending conduct was unwelcome.
This
element, when contested by defendants, shifts the focus of the
inquiry from the wrongful conduct engaged in by the defendant to
the allegedly inviting behavior of the plaintiff. The case then
72
centers on whether she welcomed the harassment by behaviors
such as failing to complain after it occurred, maintaining some type
of relationship with the harasser, or engaging in any sexually
73
related talk or behavior, whether at work or on her own time.
This element of a prima facie case is widely seen as detrimental
to the progressive cause of changing society to improve the
74
perception, status, and actual lives of women. Requiring women
who complain of workplace harassment to prove the conduct was
75
demonstrably
unwelcome harkens back to traditional,
disempowering assumptions about women’s roles, including the
assumption that women who work outside the home may be
76
sexually available unless they expressly indicate otherwise.
promotes the conservative agenda by restricting sexuality in the workplace);
Neacsu, supra note 31, at 651 (arguing that sexual harassment law has facilitated
“anti-sexual hysteria” that discredits sexual expression and reaffirms the traditional
notion of sex as subordinating and exploiting women).
71. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (stating the
frequently repeated maxim that “[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome’”).
72. Since sexually harassed employees and sexual harassment plaintiffs are
overwhelmingly female, this article will refer to the victim as “she” and “her”
throughout.
73. See Elsie Mata, Title VII Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims: Changing the Legal Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether
Challenged Conduct is Unwelcome, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 830 & nn.224–27
(noting courts’ consideration of plaintiffs’ sexual conversations, fantasies, and
histories, at and away from work, as relevant to determining unwelcomeness).
74. A number of commentators have criticized the theory and practice of
unwelcome conduct inquiries. See, e.g., Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
125, 174 (1995); Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment: The Hurdles, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1451 (1992); Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621,
626–28 (1997).
75. Proof of unwelcomeness focuses on what the harassee did, not what she
may have felt about it.
76. See Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1220, 1243–47 (1999) (connecting the “stereotypical
notion that a working woman was sexually available” with the evidence of a
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C. Progressive Treatment of Unwelcomeness – Undermining Bias and
Promoting Justice
Twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court first
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment as a legitimate
77
claim in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, but women continue to
78
experience these types of inequitable working conditions. The
goal of eliminating workplace harassment remains unfulfilled
despite the availability of legal action. Recent studies show a large
79
percentage of women still encounter sexual harassment at work.
80
Most women do not sue.
The unwelcomeness element
disadvantages women who do seek to enforce their right to a
81
workplace free of sexual harassment. By reinforcing assumptions
about sexuality and power without open examination, the
framework permits men to continue asserting that women invited
82
their sexual conduct or overtures.
Progressive trends in the
interpretation of this element could help mitigate the tendency to
reinforce traditional gender stereotypes and inequalities.
A progressive take on the unwelcomeness element is to
eliminate the requirement altogether, an idea proposed by

complainant’s provocative speech and dress approved as relevant to the
welcomeness determination by Meritor).
77. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
78. See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, The Changing Nature of
Employment-Related Sexual Harassment: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Government,
1978–1994, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 443, 443–45 (2004) (citing studies
concluding that half of all women experience sexual harassment at some point
during their working lives). Over ninety percent of reported cases involve men
harassing women. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX, THE DENIAL OF GENDER
INEQUALITY 97 (1997).
79. Mata, supra note 73, at 824–25 nn.193–95 (noting that sexual harassment
in employment “remains widespread, even epidemic, yet underreported”).
80. Only a small percentage of women who experience workplace sexual
harassment initiate formal claims. See, Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships:
Understanding the Litigation Chances of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
67, 68 (1999) (citing surveys conducted in 1981, 1988, and 1994 showing that
forty-two percent to forty-four percent of female federal employees report legally
actionable conduct, while only seven percent file formal claims).
81. See Mata, supra note 73, at 793–94 (criticizing the current analysis of
unwelcome conduct as unfairly perpetuating stereotypes about women and
placing plaintiffs at a disadvantage during litigation).
82. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist
Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 427
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992)).
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83

numerous commentators. Since unwelcome conduct is a major, if
not essential, component of sexual harassment doctrine, ceasing to
recognize it as a requirement would constitute a major departure
from tradition and precedent. Another suggested approach is to
remove the inquiry as an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case
and reconfigure it as an affirmative defense that defendants would
84
have the burden to establish.
A less radical alternative would be to interpret the
unwelcomeness standard in a manner that recognizes the need to
overcome biased traditional attitudes, to promote equality in the
workplace, and to improve the delivery of justice to the lessempowered member of our society. This interpretation would
explicitly take issue with the inherent assumptions that bind
women to the roles society required them to play in the past. Two
particular means of dealing progressively with the unwelcomeness
requirement would fit within this rubric: establishing formal,
protective rules similar to the civil “rape shield” provided by
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, and interpreting all proffered
evidence of unwelcomeness in ways that reframe and reform
stereotypes about women’s roles and permissible behavior. Each of
these two efforts, discussed below, would incorporate the
progressive values of facilitating departures from traditionally
entrenched biases that inherently put women in the workplace at a
disadvantage.
Published and unpublished Minnesota court
decisions reveal some progressive and some not-so-progressive
aspects in their treatment of unwelcomeness.
III. MINNESOTA – ‘YA NOT QUITE SURE, ‘YA ALMOST BETCHA?
Minnesota has been identified as a politically progressive
83. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
445, 449–501 (1997) (proposing a new standard based on “the respectful
person”); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 786 (2002) (arguing for the elimination of the
unwelcome conduct element in plaintiff’s prima facie case, but the retention of
welcomeness as evidence going to damages); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 813, 831 (1991) (arguing for the elimination of the unwelcome conduct
element as “doctrinally gratuitous and personally humiliating for women”); Paul
N. Monin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual
Harassment Claims under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1191 (1995). But see Franke, supra note 70, at 746 (criticizing
commentators who advocate eliminating the requirement of unwelcome conduct).
84. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 525 (1994).
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85

state. The state showed leadership and initiative on progressive
86
87
healthcare for the poor,
issues such as child welfare,
88
89
environmental policy, promotion of public education, and
90
In the area of employment, the
criminal sentencing reform.
state’s laws were frequently on the forefront of promoting social
91
justice and protecting the less powerful. In fact, the enactment of
92
Minnesota’s fair employment laws preceded Title VII.
Because women who experience workplace sexual harassment
85. See, e.g., Walter F. Mondale, Reflections on Fifty Years of Progress in Civil
Rights, Liberties, and Participation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (referring to
Minnesota as “a state that has been on the cutting edge of progressive change for
so many years”). See also Michael Naughton, The Corporation as a Community of
Work: Understanding the Firm within the Catholic Social Tradition, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV.
33, 68 n.108 (2006) (“Minnesota, despite the cold, has a high quality of life in part
because of the progressive character of its people in creating highly participative
companies which also participate in solving the problems of the community.”).
86. H.J. Cummins, Kids Really Do Count in Minnesota, Report Says, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 20, 2000, at 1A (crediting state’s progressive policies as
helping support poor families and improve child welfare).
87. See Allison Cendali, Implementation of the Children’s Health Insurance Program:
HHS, States, and Lessons for National Health Reform, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 673–74
(1998) (describing Minnesota health care reform, including insurance for lowincome persons); Catherine T. Dunlay & Peter A. Pavarini, 1993 Managed
Competition Theory as a Basis for Health Care Reform, 27 AKRON L. REV. 141, 169–71
(1993) (same).
88. See Stephanie Adams, Wind Power in Minnesota, POSITIVELY MINNESOTA
(Minn. Dept. of Employment and Economic Development), Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002,
http://www.deed.state.mn.us/lmi/publications/trends/0102/wind.htm
(describing development of wind energy policy).
89. Anna Lisa Garcia, The Paper School House: The “Business” of Texas Charter
Schools and Their Effect on the Minority Student Population, 5 SCHOLAR 259, 289–90
(2003) (noting that Minnesota was on the forefront of the development of charter
schools and included provisions designed to protect racial balance, to mitigate
costs for low-income students, and to include children with disabilities).
90. “Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to implement legally binding
sentencing guidelines developed by an independent sentencing commission.”
Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 32 CRIME & JUST. 131 (2005)
(identifying Minnesota’s progressivism as a factor allowing the state’s guidelines to
be created).
91. Minnesota is one of twenty-three states with a higher minimum wage than
required by federal law. National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.
ncsl.org/programs/employ/stateminimumwages2006.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2006). Minnesota provides a hospitable forum for plaintiffs in whistleblower cases.
Peter Gray & Andrew E. Tanick, Fresh Incentives to Whistle While You Work:
Whistleblower Claims after the Abraham and Anderson-Johanningmeier Cases, 59 BENCH &
B. MINN. 23 (Apr. 2002). See also MINN. STAT. § 363A.01 (2004) (prohibiting
employment and other types of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity).
92. Sheila Engelmeier & Jonathan J. Hegre, The Deepening Divide: Minnesota
and Federal Employment Laws, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 21, 21–22 (Apr. 2001).
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in Minnesota can choose to bring their claims in either state or
federal court, both jurisdictions are considered in this article. In
deciding where to file claims, harassment plaintiffs and their
attorneys will weigh, among other factors, the directions taken by
state appellate courts and the federal circuit court, which for
Minnesota is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Minnesota
courts interpreting the state anti-discrimination statutes frequently
93
reference and rely upon federal case law.
94
In Minnesota, as in all other states, a sexual harassment
claimant must establish that the complained-of conduct was
95
unwelcome. The interpretation of unwelcome conduct under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act also frequently references federal
96
decisional law.
Minnesota state cases reiterate the federal
articulation of unwelcome conduct: that “the employee did not
solicit or invite it, and the employee regarded the conduct as
97
undesirable or offensive.”
Both state and federal courts in
Minnesota have a mixed record on promoting progressive change
in handling alleged evidence of “unwelcome conduct.”
93. See Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. 1980)
(confirming that the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) is properly
interpreted with reference to federal Title VII decisions). There are some
differences between state and federal standards. See Hollen v. USCO Distrib.
Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 02-1119, 2004 WL 234408, at *4 n.4 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2004)
(noting that MHRA standards for vicarious liability for supervisor harassment do
not incorporate standards established by recent federal decisions); cf. 17 STEPHEN
F. BEFORT, MINN. PRACTICE SERIES: EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.8(d) (2d
ed. 2005) (stating that although the employer liability for supervisor harassment
has not been directly decided under the MHRA, Minnesota courts will probably
adopt the federal standard (incorporating the Faragher/Ellerth decisions)). See also
Engelmeier & Hegre, supra note 92, at 22 (noting differences between federal and
state law, such as that Minnesota does not explicitly differentiate between
harassment by supervisors and harassment by co-workers when determining an
employer’s vicarious liability).
94. Jennifer Ann Dobrac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and a
Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 490 (2004) (stating that unwelcome conduct
is an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case in each state’s fair employment laws).
95. MINN. STAT. § 363A.01, subdiv. 43 (2004). See also Cummings v. Koehnen,
568 N.W.2d 418, 424 (Minn. 1997) (stating sexually harassing conduct must be
unwelcome).
96. Halvorson v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 011774, 2002 WL 31371938, at
*7 n.5 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2002) (assuming that state and federal standards are the
same in determining whether conduct is unwelcome); Miles v. DDF, Inc., No. A031376, 2004 WL 1049286, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 2004) (referencing federal
case law in analyzing MHRA claim of unwelcome conduct).
97. Myers v. State, No. C4-99-855, 2000 WL 2620, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
2000) (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir.
1992)).
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A. Establishment of Protective Formal Rules of Evidence
The unwelcomeness inquiry provides defendants in any
jurisdiction with avenues to intimidate and denigrate the harassed
employee during both pre-trial and trial phases of a case.
Questions posed during discovery contain barely veiled
insinuations about her lack of chastity or other ways in which she
“asked for” whatever harassment she received. Opportunistic
98
defense attorneys seek to obtain and introduce evidence of
99
100
abortions,
pornography
plaintiffs’ past sexual partners,
101
102
consumption, and work as nude models.
While it may shock a
harassment victim when the proceeding becomes focused on her
103
many defendants quickly understand the potential
behavior,
104
advantages of counterattack.
98. “They want to show that the plaintiff is a nut or a slut.” Monin, supra note
83, at 1155 (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Phillip Kay). The “nuts or sluts” defense
strategy tells a story that the complaining woman is too promiscuous to sexually
harass and/or too unbalanced to be believed. Id. See also SUSAN ESTRICH, SEX AND
POWER, 179, 185 (2000) (referencing “the ‘nuts and sluts defense’”).
99. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr. of Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir.
1988) (holding that evidence of plaintiff’s sexual history is not probative of
whether she welcomed sexual advances at work); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D.
481 (D. Utah 1987) (prohibiting discovery of plaintiff’s past sexual partners of
which the harasser was unaware).
100. See, e.g., Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that sexual harassment
plaintiff had undergone an abortion). See also Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
101. See, e.g., Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing effort by
defendant employer to question plaintiff about her viewing of pornography);
Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that trial court properly excluded evidence regarding her consumption of
pornography).
102. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the admission of evidence that plaintiff had, on her own time, posed
nude for a national magazine); Thoreson v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 59 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1085 (BNA) (1990), aff’d 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 955 (BNA) (1992)
(holding that nude model does not automatically welcome workplace sexual
harassment).
103. In the author’s experience as a practicing attorney, clients in sexual
harassment cases are astonished when the inquiry shifts away from the wrongful
conduct of their harassers and fixes on their behavior, with obvious connotations
of sin and transgression.
104. As allegedly stated by one well-known defendant:
If any woman ever breathed a word, I’ll make her pay so dearly that she’ll
wish she’d never been born. I’ll rake her through the mud, bring up
things in her life and make her so miserable that she’ll be destroyed.
And besides, she wouldn’t be able to afford the lawyers I can, or endure it
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This strategy of accentuating any signs of sexuality, in order
to depict the victim as promiscuous and immoral, replicates tactics
106
successfully used by defendants in rape cases.
There, the
purported use of such evidence was to establish the defense of
consent, but the real agenda was manipulating commonly held
stereotypes about women in order to malign the victim.
Because criminal “rape shield” provisions now provide a layer
of protection from such abuses, parties who seek to impugn the
victim of a sex crime must satisfy a higher threshold of probative
107
108
value before presenting evidence about her sexual history.
Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 412 in 1978 to protect
victims of rape and criminal sexual assault from degrading crossexaminations about their sexual histories and to prevent rape trials
109
from becoming inquisitions into the morality of the victims.
As
stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
financially as long as I can. And nobody would believe her, it’d be her
word against mine, and who are they going to believe? Me or some
unstable woman making outrageous accusations. They’d see her as some
psycho, someone unstable. Besides, I’d never make the mistake of
picking unstable crazy girls like that.
EXTRA! UPDATE, (a Bimonthly Newsletter of FAIR), Dec. 2004, at 4 (quoting
allegations of comments made by defendant Bill O’Reilly, as contained in a lawsuit
filed by O’Reilly Factor producer Andrea Mackris in November 2004).
105. Even ordinarily innocuous behavior by a woman can be translated into
sexual solicitation. See LEE MADIGAN & NANCY GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY’S
CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM 102–03 (1991) (“[the defense attorney] kept
talking about how I wear shorts when I water my lawn--like I was a prostitute and
sending out invitations.”).
106. ESTRICH, supra note 98, at 179. The use of past sexual history evidence to
persuade a jury that a victim more than likely consented to rape or sexual assault is
devastating to both prosecution and complainant. See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE
HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 41 (1992);
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 254 (1966); Marah deMeule,
Note, Privacy Protections for the Rape Complainant: Half a Fig Leaf, 80 N.D. L. REV.
145, 148–49 (2004) (citing Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764, 796–97
(1986)).
107. Although both women and men are victims of sex crimes, women are the
subject of this type of violence far more frequently than men.
108. Every state now has a criminal rape shield, embodied in either a statute or
rule of evidence. deMeule, supra note 106, at 146. State rape shields resulted
from the same basic impetus as the federal shield: an intersection that arose
during the 1970s between increased awareness of violence against women, feminist
advocacy to improve the legal treatment of rape complainants, and a strong “law
and order” political culture. Id. at 147–50.
109. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (quoting testimony of Rep.
Holtzman during discussion preceding passage of H.R. 4727, which enacted Rule
412, and citing 124 CONG. REC. H11944 (1978)).
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The essential insight behind the rape shield statute is that
in an age of post-Victorian sexual practice, in which most
unmarried young women are sexually active, the fact that
a woman has voluntarily engaged in a particular sexual
activity on previous occasions does not provide
appreciable support for an inference that she consented to
engage in this activity with the defendant on the occasion
on which she claims that she was raped. And allowing
defense counsel to spread the details of a woman’s sex life
on the public record not only causes embarrassment to
the woman but by doing so makes it less likely that victims
110
of rape will press charges.
111
In a surprisingly forward-thinking move, Congress modified
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1994 to provide similar
112
Rule 412
protections in civil cases involving sexual misconduct.
110. Sandoval v. Acevedo, 996 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
Illinois criminal rape shield protections).
111. Congress actually rejected the Supreme Court’s position that the sexual
background of a harassment plaintiff is “obviously relevant.” Weiner, supra note
74, at 636–37.
112. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 states:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible.
The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided
in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
...
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by
the alleged victim. . . .
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must -(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is
offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different
time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim
or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or
representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a
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was amended so that it applies to civil matters involving “alleged
113
The Rule imposes a presumption that
sexual misconduct.”
evidence offered to prove a victim’s “other sexual behavior” (such
as physical conduct, fantasies, dreams) or “alleged . . . sexual
predisposition” (including mode of dress, speech, life-style) is
114
inadmissible.
Congress intended the amendment “to safeguard
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential
embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping that is associated with
public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of
115
sexual innuendo into the factfinding process.”
The Rule allows
for exceptions when the proponent can establish that the probative
value of the evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to the
116
victim.
Several federal circuits recognize the 1994 amendments as
117
applying to sexual harassment cases. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which has jurisdiction over any appeals of Minnesota
Federal District Court decisions, has refused to issue a holding
118
directly on the issue.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit implied that
the Rule covers sexual harassment matters, but found “no danger
of harm or prejudice,” despite the trial court’s refusal to hold the
required in camera hearing following objections based on Rule
right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the
record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless
the court orders otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 412.
113. The amendment was made despite opposition from the Supreme Court.
Aiken, supra note 48, at 564 (examining the development of Rule 412).
114. FED. R. EVID. 412 (a)(1)–(2); FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note
to 1994 Amendments.
115. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 Amendments.
116. FED. R. EVID. 412. See also FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to
1994 Amendments. To fit within the exception, the probative value of the
evidence must “substantially outweigh[ ] the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party.” FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(2) (reversing the usual
presumption of admissibility set forth in FED. R. EVID. 403, which provides that
relevant evidence may be excluded if the probative value is substantially
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading jury, undue
delay, waste of time, or cumulative evidence).
117. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Federal Rule 412 applies to sexual harassment lawsuits); Wolak v. Spucci, 217
F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132
F.3d 848, 855–56 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). See also Howard v. Historic Tours of Am.,
177 F.R.D. 48, 50 n.4 (D.D.C. 1997) (referring to advisory committee’s note as
making clear that Rule 412 applies to victims of sexual harassment).
118. Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 906 (8th Cir. 2002); Beard v. Flying J,
Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 801 (8th Cir. 2001).
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119

Few states have similarly amended their rape shield statutes to
120
protect civil litigants.
Where civil shields do exist, some are so
narrow they apply only in special circumstances: for example,
Colorado’s evidence law provides privacy only to sexual assault (not
harassment) plaintiffs alleging harm from persons in professional
121
roles such as medical professionals or clergy.
The language of
the few civil shields encompassing sexual harassment reflects their
foundation in the context of criminal evidence rules and the
influence of the federal shield. For example, California’s Evidence
Code shields sexual history evidence in civil actions alleging “sexual
122
harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery.”
This language is
similar to that of Hawaii’s Rule 412, protecting complainants in
123
Iowa’s shield for
“sexual offense and sexual harassment cases,”
124
those seeking damages from “sexual abuse” and Maine’s shield
125
for those complaining of “sexual misconduct.”
After Meritor, women were placed in the position of having to
119. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2006) (“While
we agree that the district court erred in mischaracterizing this evidence as nonRule 412 evidence in the first instance, there was no danger of harm or prejudice
to Wilson or any other party, and the district court correctly determined that it was
admissible as relevant to the issues raised by Wilson’s claims.”).
120. Only California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, and Maine have state law rape
shield-type protections that expressly extend into the civil arena. See infra notes
121–125. See also Lewis B. Gainer, The Missouri Human Rights Act is the Law of Choice
for Sexual Harassment Victims’ Privacy, 60 J. MO. B. 20 (Jan.–Feb. 2004) (arguing that
more states should provide civil shields).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-131 (West 2004).
122. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West 2006). California’s shield prohibits all
opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of
sexual conduct unless a) plaintiff alleges loss of consortium as an injury; b) the
evidence concerns plaintiff’s conduct with the respondent; c) plaintiff herself or
her witnesses introduce such evidence, thereby opening up cross-examination; or,
d) evidence is used for impeachment per other evidence rules. Id.
123. HAW. R. EVID. 412. Hawaii extended its shield to civil cases in 1999.
Renee Furuta, 1999 Hawai’i Legislative Update, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 323, 330 (2000).
124. IOWA R. EVID. 5.412.
125. ME. R. EVID. 412. Maine’s 2000 amendment to its Rule 412 extended it to
civil cases. ME. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note. Maine decided not to
follow the federal model, but added two provisions of its own drafting. Id. The
amended rule prohibits reputation or opinion evidence of past sexual behavior of
the plaintiff. Id. However, the court is given broad discretion to allow evidence of
specific sexual conduct ‘only’ if the probative value of such evidence outweighs its
potential ability to prejudice, confuse, or mislead the jury, and cause ‘unwarranted
harm’ to the party. Id. The Advisory Committee notes offer a very thoughtful
discussion of these rules, and the careful balancing act, which it hopes that judges
will follow in admitting such evidence. Id.
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explain why their clothing choices did not eliminate their right to
126
The enactment of Rule
work without being sexually harassed.
412 provides a layer of protection, purporting to ensure that before
evidence of manner of dress is presented, a judge must agree that
“its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to
127
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”
But in states
without civil shields, Meritor still governs without formal procedural
protections. A party may still use the regular motion in limine
procedure to argue that evidence of the way a woman dressed is
unfairly prejudicial and not probative of whether she welcomed
particular conduct at work; however, Meritor is still good law and
the safest route for a judge is to allow the evidence to be admitted.
This reluctance to exclude such evidence, even where civil shields
are in effect, can be seen in the number of times that reviewing
courts have held that the failure to hold the required Rule 412(c)
128
hearing is harmless error.
The amendment of Rule 412 and implementation of similar
state rules have not eliminated the abuse of sexual background
129
information under cover of rebutting unwelcomeness.
But in
cases where such rules are followed, the effect has been to promote
a fair focus on the alleged harassment and away from past activities
of the plaintiff that are likely to trade on stereotype to unfairly
130
prejudice the factfinder.
Requiring parties who intend to offer
evidence of a person’s past sexual behavior or predisposition to
establish that the probative force of the information is significantly
126. “The opinion of the Court in Meritor asks: Did she ask for it? Did she
deserve it because of her clothes and conversation? Meritor indulges trial judges
who want to evade their duties with a stereotype.” Bernstein, supra note 83, at 501
(proposing a new standard based on “the respectful person”).
127. FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(2).
128. See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 801 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the trial court’s failure to hold Rule 412(c) hearing was harmless because
plaintiff knew her employer intended to introduce evidence of her sexual conduct
in the workplace).
129. See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)
(sanctioning defendant for violation of Rule 412(c) order by introducing alleged
sexual fantasies and practices). Commentators criticize civil application of Rule
412 as irreparably inconsistent because it relies upon the discretion of individual
judges. Aiken, supra note 48, at 570–81. Aiken argues for a new civil rule that
more closely tracks the rule for criminal cases. Id. at 580.
130. See Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 120–24 (S.D. Ohio
1999) (articulating that evidence of plaintiff’s prior sexual relationship,
conversations about oral sex, alleged flirtatious behavior, and use of profanity
should not have been admitted pursuant to Rule 412 and granting plaintiff’s
motion for new trial).
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greater than the danger of harm and unfair prejudice, via an in
camera hearing, provides a check on the cultural biases that
otherwise maintain social and economic inequality.
131
Minnesota has never considered amending its rape shield to
132
The state’s failure to
encompass civil harassment plaintiffs.
create any formal protective mechanism to shield sexual
harassment plaintiffs shows a lack of progressive initiative.
Application of the evidentiary rule limiting the admissibility of
sexually related conduct of a civil harassment victim is an example
of government regulation intended to equalize social and legal
imbalances. The mechanism of formal rules protects sexual
harassment victims from lingering social biases and stereotypes that
133
prevent the substance of their claims from being heard. The lack
of formal protections for sexual harassment plaintiffs who wish to
complain about how they were treated at work allows them to be
intimidated out of pursuing valid claims, perpetuating the social
and economic inequality of women.
The absence of such
evidentiary protections, when other jurisdictions have enacted
them, also implicitly allows and condones the reinforcement of
traditional biases against sexually autonomous women. Minnesota
has not handled the unwelcomeness inquiry as progressively as the
federal judicial system or the several states that have added rape
134
shield-type protections for victims in civil sexual misconduct suits.
B. Reframing and Reforming Stereotypes About Women, Sex, and Desire
The notion that women who have engaged in some sexual
conduct in the past may reasonably be perceived to have invited all
other sexual conduct is present in several other variations that are
often relied upon and reinforced as the unwelcome conduct
131. Minnesota has had a criminal rape shield law since 1975. See MINN. STAT.
§ 609.347 (2004).
132. Conversation with Peter Thompson, Professor of Law, Hamline University
School of Law, Chair of the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence, in St. Paul, MN (June 7, 2006). Mr. Thompson also noted that
Minnesota’s Rules of Evidence are not modeled after the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
133. The rule’s reliance on judicial discretion and the risk that judges will be
seduced by stereotype are problematic. See Aiken, supra note 48, at 570–81. Still, a
procedural rule that plaintiffs can assert is preferable to the absence of any such
rule, which could be deemed to signify that state’s intentional unwillingness to
limit such evidence.
134. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1325-131 (West 2004).
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requirement plays out in litigation. As sexual harassment disputes
are argued through the court system, some themes underlying the
interpretation of the victim’s conduct as “welcoming” emerge.
The structure of the inquiry itself reinforces the notion that
women who engage in paid employment in the workforce may be
assumed to potentially invite sexual overtures unless they overtly
indicate otherwise. Abandoning the “separate sphere” of the home
is used as a proxy for past sexual conduct. Included within this
notion is the unstated, but overarching, presumption that all
women are open to potential sexual conduct with men. Thus,
women who fail to adhere to the norms for expected feminine
behavior are viewed as having “asked for” the harassment they
received. This interpretation creates a penalty for non-conforming
behavior, rendering some sexual behavior an invitation for
unlimited, even abusive, sexual conduct. The same assumptions
transform sexual behavior with certain persons to an invitation
extended to all other persons. Likewise, women who do not make
formal complaints about the harassment and women who treat the
harasser in friendly ways are penalized for violating behavioral
expectations. A sideline theme in several Minnesota decisions is
the notion that some claims of unwelcome harassment are actually
mere manifestations of regret or ambivalence about sexual
135
encounters.
The presence of each of these anti-progressive assumptions in
sexual harassment case law is explored below, followed by an
examination of the extent to which Minnesota plaintiffs can
anticipate that their courts will disavow traditional stereotypes that
perpetuate the social inequality of women.
1. Good Girls Don’t – Stereotypes and Assumptions Based on the
Impropriety of Certain Conduct by Women
Progressive treatment of unwelcomeness would reject theories
135. See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. The other pattern noted
in the Minnesota decisions analyzing unwelcomeness is the frequency of
unpublished opinions. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 142, 152, 174, 178, 182,
188–89, 191–92. This may reflect a feeling on the part of the courts that each
decision should be made based very closely on the specific facts at hand, such that
allowing them to become published precedent creates a false impression as to the
boundaries of the law. On the other hand, the lack of clear precedent leaves
plaintiffs vulnerable to fear and intimidation, since there are no reliable
boundaries for admissible or inadmissible evidence with regard to the issue of
unwelcomeness.
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based on outdated stereotypes and assumptions about the way
women should or should not behave. Traditional norms for female
behavior prohibited sexual expression and required women to hide
their sexuality. Respectable women did not engage in sexually
open or expressive ways, and if they did, such women were deemed
to have invited an entire universe of sexual overtures from others.
In other words, because the woman violated standardized
behavioral norms restricting female sexuality, she provoked the
harassing conduct and lost the right to complain when it occurred.
When the unwelcomeness inquiry critiques the female employee’s
behavior for signs that she invited the harassment, any deviation
from the traditional role of a “good girl” can be argued as evidence
that the conduct was welcome. Perpetuation of these norms forces
women to choose between relinquishing their individual rights with
regard to sexuality or facing being categorized as too promiscuous
to merit protection from harassment.
Progressive doctrine would not require women to cover their
sexuality to avoid inviting sexual advances at work. Women who do
not abide by the unwritten rules about dress, language, and
discretion are deprived of a fair process, if not a remedy, since the
law expressly considers whether they brought the harassment upon
themselves.
A progressive take on the unwelcomeness
determination would discard this double standard as entrenching a
tradition of inequality.
a. Working Women Are Sexually Available, Unless They
Unequivocally Indicate Otherwise
The unwelcomeness doctrine has been justified as necessary
because women may be interested in sexual and/or romantic
136
overtures at any time, including on the job. Instead of requiring
that the alleged harasser establish why he had reason to believe his
overtures would be welcomed, the law incorporates an assumption
that any and all women may welcome sexual attention from men at
137
work.
The recipient of the harassment is required to disprove
136. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 747 (stating the “possibility” that “some
sex-based workplace conduct may not cause harm has led some courts to assume
such conduct is welcome until proven otherwise”).
137. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says?; Legal and Psychological Constructions of
Women’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
97 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (stating that
“[b]urdening the plaintiff with proving that the man’s behavior was unwelcome
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this assumption by establishing that her behavior indicated
138
otherwise.
This aspect of unwelcomeness perpetuates a long history of
sexually objectifying women, especially those who venture beyond
their prescribed sphere. For example, women have been denied
employment opportunities on the basis that their mere presence in
139
the workplace would encourage sexual assaults.
Despite their
now common participation in the paid workforce, working women
continue to be sexualized and their rights evaluated in light of their
status as sexual objects holding interest to men.
The stereotype that a woman who works outside the home
thereby indicates sexual availability is steeped in traditional gender
roles that disenfranchise women. The underlying assumption is a
carryover from the time when women who participated in the
economic marketplace were viewed as likely to be prostitutes.
Separate-spheres ideology, ordaining stereotypical female roles and
behaviors as the natural destiny of women, underlies the law’s
treatment of women who violate behavioral norms as inviting
140
harassment. This theory accepted legal regulation of conduct in
the public sphere of government and business, while viewing
domestic and family disputes as existing in the private sphere, and
141
therefore not properly subject to the purview of law.
Women
who work have ventured out of their proper sphere.
A variety of this theme underlies the basis for some Minnesota
court decisions. In one case, a woman who conversed about
assumes that any woman is sexually available to any man, known or unknown—
unless and until she can convince him (and the court) otherwise”).
138. Welcomeness is presumed, absent sufficient contrary evidence. See, e.g.,
Docktor v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 533, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(holding overtures by boss were “not . . . clearly unwelcome,” even though female
employee rejected them), aff’d, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
139. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (holding that women
could be excluded from working as prison guards in male penitentiaries).
140. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 51, at 163 (“Since [the] ‘paramount
destiny and mission’ of women is mandated by ‘nature,’ ‘divine ordinance,’ and
‘the law of the Creator,’ the civil law need not recognize the claims of women who
deviate from their proper role.”) (critiquing Justice Joseph Bradley’s concurrence
in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)).
141. Taub & Schneider, supra note 51, at 154–56 (describing traditional lack of
legal recognition or enforcement of rights in the “private sphere,” in which
women were once relegated to inhabiting). See also BARBARA EHRENREICH &
DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD, TWO CENTURIES OF THE EXPERTS’ ADVICE TO
WOMEN 12–13 (2005) (connecting the creation of two opposing, separate spheres
to the rise of the Market economy during the nineteenth century industrialization
and capitalization).
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drinking and hot tubs during a business dinner was criticized
because “she did not do or say ‘anything overtly to tell [the
142
harasser] that she was unwilling to participate in sex with him.’”
The court’s comment implies that when a woman has a meal with
business associates and drinking and hot tubs are discussed, she
needs to indicate that she does not intend to have sex with any of
her dinner partners. In another case, the lower court held sexual
conduct was not unwelcome because “sexual tension” or “requests
143
for a romantic relationship” are not sexual harassment.
By their
very presence in the workplace, these women were expected to
encounter some level of sexuality or sexual advances, and it was up
to them to prove that they did not want them.
This incorporation of the assumption that women at work may
be assumed to welcome sexualized conduct from men is especially
unfair to women who come to work without any interest in
sexualized conduct, particularly from men.
Because the
144
unwelcomeness doctrine assumes that all women are straight, it
frequently overlooks the possibility that some women are lesbians,
or are otherwise not interested in sexual conduct from colleagues.
A progressive interpretation of unwelcomeness would not assume
all women are straight, which marginalizes sexual minorities and
essentializes women.
Progressive treatment of the unwelcome conduct inquiry
would facilitate a workplace without harassment on the basis of sex,
understanding the individual and societal benefit that such
regulation has. Progressive doctrine would unapologetically seek
this goal as an example of where government can do good.
Progressive treatment of unwelcomeness would refuse to condone
traditional notions about women who earn money by working
outside the home. Such analysis would depart from the assumption
that all women are sexually available at work, absent outward
indications either way.

142. Halvorson v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 011774RHKAJB, 2002 WL
31371938, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2002).
143. Petersen v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, No. C7-94-510, 1994 WL
455699, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994) (reversing the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on three out of four causes of action).
144. See Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale: Was It a
Victory?, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 113, 147 (1999) (noting that under the
unwelcomeness framework, women are “presumed to be heterosexual and
therefore to find at least some sexual talk by some men welcome”).
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b. All or Nothing – Expressing Some Sexual Openness or
Participating in Vulgarity
The unwelcomeness requirement connotes that women who
engage in some sexual behavior are therefore amenable to any
other sexualized conduct, absent affirmative proof to the
145
contrary.
Suggestive banter and innuendo can be argued to
welcome escalated conduct, such as obscene gestures, physical
146
Participation in sexual jokes and
touching, and outright abuse.
comments can be found to welcome groping, shoving, and threats
147
of violence.
This aspect of the unwelcome conduct inquiry
enables plaintiffs to be humiliated and intimidated during pre-trial
discovery and motions, regardless of whether the evidence is later
148
ruled to be inadmissible. Even conduct that the harasser did not
perceive firsthand and activities that the woman engaged in away
145. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 747 (critiquing the unwelcomeness
element as “suggest[ing] that a particular employee’s willingness to engage in sexbased conduct in the workplace justifies assuming that any employee may be open
to an office romance until that employee makes clear that she is not”).
146. Weiner, supra note 74, at 627–28 (“If she acted in a ‘sexually aggressive’
way or used ‘sexually-oriented language,’ this is viewed as a justification for
abuse.”). See also Ripley v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., No. 04AP-313, 2004
WL 2361571, at *1–2, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (agreeing that where a
woman had engaged in sexual joking, remarked about her breasts, collected
suggestive cartoons and jokes, did not hide her sexual activities, compared breast
sizes with a female co-worker, and one day did not wear a bra to work, such
evidence negated her claim that she did not welcome direct sexual advances from
co-workers, including lip-licking, daily demands for sex, lifting her skirt, and
blatantly sexual gestures).
147. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1991)
(noting that plaintiff who had suffered from being punched in the kidneys,
tickled, handcuffed to various objects in the office, forced to put her head in the
laps of male co-workers, mocked with an electric cattle prod, dunked into a toilet,
and maced could not prevail on sexual harassment claim because she participated
in similar activities since she had told dirty jokes, made sexual comments, showed
off her abdominal scars, went braless, and gave suggestive gifts to her colleagues);
Mangrum v. Republic Indus., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1252–53 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
(stating that plaintiff who engaged in vulgar language, gave massages, and
exchanged back scratches with co-workers is deemed to have welcomed
supervisor’s repeated requests for sex and patting her behind), aff’d, 88 F. App’x
390 (11th Cir. 2003); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559,
1563–64 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that because she engaged in sexual banter,
plaintiff was deemed to have welcomed the actions of a co-worker who placed his
penis in her hand), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991).
148. See Katie M. Patton, Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues That Plague Sexual
Harassment Suits, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 997–98 (2006) (noting effects of discovery
abuses, including those hinging on disproving unwelcome conduct, in sexual
harassment litigation).
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from work can be examined in discovery and proffered by
defendants as arguably constituting solicitation of sexual conduct
149
in the workplace.
The most regressive trend is where some
participation in sexual or vulgar activities precludes an employee
from establishing that other, even escalated, types of sexual
conduct were unwelcome as a matter of law, depriving the
employee of the opportunity to present her case to a factfinder.
A progressive evaluation of whether conduct was unwelcome
would not interpret some acceptance or expression of sexuality by
female employees as inviting disproportionate sexual overtures or
150
outright abuse in the workplace.
Also, progressive treatment of
the law would examine the possibility that the conduct in question
was engaged in or acquiesced to without inviting or soliciting the
conduct. Developments in decisional law should recognize that
some women may be drawn to engage in responsive behavior
merely as a way of defending themselves with retorts, as a way of
fitting in, or out of fear of the consequences of refusing to accede
151
to advances.
The all-or-nothing premise lingers on in Minnesota trial
courts, but the appellate court appears unconvinced by it. In one
149. See Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 77 F. App’x 24, 28–30 (1st Cir. 2003)
(defendants argued on appeal that trial court improperly excluded evidence that
plaintiff bared her breasts while working at a previous job, which defendants
contended could establish that sexual comments made by supervisor at
subsequent job were not unwelcome); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d
559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that because evidence of sexually provocative
speech or dress is relevant in determining whether conduct was unwelcome, the
fact that plaintiff posed for nude photos outside of the workplace was relevant;
plaintiff’s later victory against this holding was marred by the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion, which agreed that posing nude outside of the workplace was relevant to a
consideration of the totality of circumstances), rev’d, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
150. Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting “a
striking disproportion” between the conduct female employees allegedly
consented to with other employees and the conduct allegedly committed by the
defendant harassers).
151. See, e.g., James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women’s Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543, 545
(1995) (stating that women try to defuse workplace sexual harassment by joking
about it). Many harassed employees respond in indirect, non-confrontational
ways, such as by “ignoring the harasser (44%), avoiding the harasser (28%),
making a joke of the behavior (15%), or going along with the behavior (7%).”
Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction
of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 83, 86 n.1 (2005) (quoting U.S.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES (1995), http://www.
mspb.gov/studies/sexhar.pdf).
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case, conduct had been determined to be not unwelcome as a
matter of law, based on evidence that the employee had “frequently
152
used profanities and engaged in vulgar behavior.”
Her behavior
was found to have welcomed the following behavior from her coworkers as a matter of law: explicit references to sexual activities,
forcing her head to a male co-worker’s crotch area, showing
pornographic photos, intruding on her in the bathroom, grabbing
her thigh, telling her that women belonged at home, giving her
153
orders without authority, and threatening her for complaining.
Reversing, the appellate court found that the harassment was
unwelcome, and noted that women who use “foul language or
sexual innuendo in a consensual setting” do not waive their right to
154
a workplace free of harassment.
Decisions in Minnesota Federal District Court adhere to the
principle that unwelcomeness should be determined by the trier of
fact, regardless of the plaintiff’s participation in name-calling or
suggestive comments. In one case, the employer argued that two
women who participated in name-calling in the workplace had
155
welcomed the sexually vulgar conduct of their co-workers.
The
court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment and
held that whether the conduct was unwelcome was an issue of
156
disputed fact for trial.
A more progressive opinion would have
indicated that even if defendants can establish that the plaintiffs
engaged in mutual name-calling, it provides scant basis for arguing
that the plaintiffs welcomed crude sexual drawings, sexual gestures,
exposure of the genitals, touching of their bodies (including
breasts), or lewd sexual propositions.
Similarly, an employer-defendant in another case argued that

152. Myers v. State, No. C4-99-855, 2000 WL 2620, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
2000) (quoting uncited underlying district court decision).
153. Id. at *3.
154. Id. at *2 (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
155. Castellanos v. Wood Design, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3416 DWF/JSM, 2005 WL
41628, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 2005). The conduct consisted of the following: 1)
giving the women a drawing of a donkey with human genitals and sexually vulgar
words inscribed on it; 2) grabbing and exposing themselves; 3) touching or
attempting to touch the women’s breasts, shoulder, and bellybutton; 4) telling the
women they should have their underwear removed “and to itch [their] pussies;”
and 5) calling them names (“bitches,” “cunt,” and “whores”), remarking “touch
your ass,” “son of a dick,” and “mother fuckers,” and saying they wanted to
“scratch” the women’s “pussies.” Id. at *1.
156. Id. at *4.
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because the employee had participated in numerous off-color
conversations at work, she thereby welcomed the sexual overtures
157
and vulgar conduct of her supervisors.
The court rejected the
employer’s contention that because she had engaged in vulgar
language in some situations, the conduct of her supervisors could
158
not have been unwelcome to her. Her behavior in other contexts
was found to be relevant to the factual determination as to
unwelcome conduct, but not sufficient to grant summary
159
judgment.
But the Eighth Circuit’s commitment to this principle appears
somewhat compromised and arguably dependent upon the gender
of the plaintiff. A three-judge panel held that a female employee’s
use of offensive language precluded her from establishing that her
supervisor’s use of the same or similar words was unwelcome as a
160
matter of law.
Judge Lay dissented, stating that the employee’s
occasional use of swearing in her general communication could
not constitute welcoming, as a matter of law, the constant repeated
use of the same or similar words in a significantly different manner,
161
one that was directed towards demeaning women.
Judge Lay
emphasized that the use of “foul language” in the workplace might
weigh against a factual finding that sexual harassment was
162
unwelcome, but should not bar a claim entirely as a matter of law:
“I am unaware of any case that precludes a plaintiff from arguing
157. Dull v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Duluth, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024 (D. Minn.
1998). Supervisor misconduct included referencing a picture of a penis, asking
whether she had PMS, disseminating an off-color joke about gynecologists,
disseminating a joke about blondes, gesturing toward her breasts and the
supervisor’s crotch while telling a sexual joke, eying her cleavage and asking
whether she was trying to arouse him, and telling her that she had nice breasts. Id.
at 1024.
158. Id. at 1026.
159. Id. (“While her conduct in other contexts may otherwise be relevant, it
does not demonstrate as a matter of law that she was inviting all types of sexually
explicit statements and conduct.” (citing Burns, 989 F.2d at 963–64)).
160. Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2000). The
decision involved a very thin consensus. Id. Judge Beam held that Ms. Hocevar
was unable to show that her supervisor’s constant references to women as
“bitches,” “fucking bitches,” and “fat fucking bitches” were unwelcome because
she had also used the words “bitch” and “fuck” in the workplace. Id. at 724, 736–
37. Judge Gibson concurred in the result, writing separately to state, among other
things, that because Ms. Hocevar admitted using the words, she could not establish
that her supervisor’s use of the same words was subjectively offensive to her. Id. at
740–41.
161. Id. at 729–30 (Lay, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 730.
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that the employer’s constant use of sexually charged language and
off-color jokes is unwelcome merely because the plaintiff at times
163
engaged in swearing.”
Judge Lay opined that the circumstances described by the
employee, including her complaint to management and her need
for psychological care, were sufficient to establish at trial that the
164
harassment was unwelcome and subjectively offensive to her. She
was not permitted that opportunity because her claim was denied
on summary judgment.
Just two years later, the Eighth Circuit rejected an employer’s
argument that a male employee’s use of sexually explicit language
at work precluded a finding that vulgarities directed at him were
165
unwelcome.
Evidence presented at trial that the employee
repeatedly complained to management, documented and then
tried to erase sexual statements about himself, and sustained
psychological difficulties was found sufficient to support a finding
166
that the graffiti was unwelcome.
Apparently without irony, that
panel cited to Judge Lay’s dissent in Hocevar for the proposition
that complaining to management and experiencing fear and
167
depression constitute evidence that conduct was unwelcome.
c.

All About Eve – One’s as Good as the Next

A similar premise that is reinforced by traditional
interpretations of the unwelcomeness inquiry is that a woman’s
sexual conduct with one person tends to show that she welcomed
168
This theory relies upon
sexual conduct with other persons.
163. Id. Judge Lay also criticized the majority for ignoring the supervisor’s
communication of violent threats, vulgar jokes, a sexually explicit audiotape, and
apparent approval of similar behavior from others at meetings. Id.
164. Id.
165. Beach v. Yellow Freight Sys., 312 F.3d 391, 396–97 (8th Cir. 2002). The
complained-of conduct that was allegedly “invited or solicited” by the employee’s
explicit language consisted of graffiti written throughout the workplace that
identified him by name, asserted that he was gay, and obscenely accused him of
engaging in specific sexual activities, including incest and bestiality. Id. at 394-96.
166. Id. at 396-97. The court agreed that he “neither solicited nor invited it
and regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive.” Id. at 396 (quoting Scusa
v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999)).
167. Beach, 312 F.3d at 396–67 (citing Hocevar, 223 F.3d at 730).
168. See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 797–98 (8th Cir. 2001)
(discussing the employer’s contention that supervisor’s conduct, touching the
plaintiff’s breasts with his body, cooking tongs, and a pen was welcomed because
plaintiff was alleged to have suggestively touched a male co-worker’s thigh and to
have frequently used suggestive language at work).
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traditional requirements of female chastity and the notion of the
169
fallen woman.
Decisions in many jurisdictions treat this theory as valid,
emboldening defendants and neutralizing plaintiffs’ efforts to
preclude the admission of such evidence. A woman who discusses
her sex life with one co-worker may be argued to have lost the right
170
to complain about sexual inquiries from another co-worker.
A
woman who openly engages in a sexual relationship with one coworker may be asserted to have welcomed a potential sexual
171
relationship with any other co-worker.
A woman who collects
sexual jokes and makes comments about her breasts in a discussion
with a female co-worker may be alleged to have welcomed a male
172
co-worker’s propositions and vulgar remarks.
By facilitating these types of arguments as potential defenses to
sexual harassment claims, the unwelcomeness requirement
supports the assumption that female sexuality is somehow fungible,
and that a woman’s decision to engage in sexual conduct with a
173
man means she will do the same with any other man. Minnesota
courts have acquiesced to this faulty logic on at least one
174
occasion.
Progressive law, seeking to reform sexist double standards,
169. See Rachael Knight, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed Mothers,
Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 488–89,
499–520 (2004) (discussing courts’ unfavorable treatment of discrimination claims
made by women who refused to “cover” (i.e., hide, minimize, or neutralize) the
fact that they were unmarried and pregnant).
170. See, e.g., King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.H. 1996)
(explaining that innuendo used by a plaintiff with co-workers was potentially
relevant to determining whether sexual overtures from a supervisor were
welcome), aff’d, 116 F.3d 965 (1st Cir. 1997).
171. See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that defendants offered evidence of plaintiff’s sexual comments and
behavior away from work with other co-workers to establish welcomeness of
harassment from a co-worker).
172. Ripley v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., No. 04AP-313, 2004 WL
2361571, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (mentioning the effect of plaintiff’s
use of sexual jokes on unwelcomeness).
173. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 747 n.69 (citing Benedet, supra note 74, at
140) (arguing that investigation of women’s sexual history in harassment matters is
founded on the idea that “[s]exual acts are . . . essentially fungible for women,
both as to the partner with whom they engage in them and as to the location in
which they take place”).
174. Gatzke v. Campbell, No. C9-97-507, 1997 WL 757383, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 9, 1997) (where defendant argued that because plaintiff had engaged in
off-color humor with bar staff, sexual overtures from her supervisor were not
unwelcome).
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would not assume that a woman’s sexual expression or conduct
with one person or co-worker invites sexual overtures from any or
all others. Some courts in other jurisdictions have overtly rejected
this theory at the discovery stage, denying the employer motion to
compel the harassed employee to reveal all sexual relationships she
175
may have had with co-workers. In doing so, the District Court of
the District of Columbia articulated that the interpretation of
welcoming conduct should not be tethered to traditions that
hobble women, explicitly rejecting the underlying premise of
defendants’ argument that if a woman was known to have engaged
in a sexual relationship with one co-worker, it would be reasonable
to assume that she welcomed other sexual advances at work:
[T]hat perception would be reasonable only if it fairly
could be said that a man who learns of a woman’s affair is
justified in believing that she will be as willing to have a
sexual relationship with him as she was to have one with
her lover. While such a perception might have been
justified, in men’s minds, in Victorian England and
Wharton’s “Age of Innocence” in America, when men
discriminated between the women they married and the
women they slept with, it has nothing to do with America
in 1997. While religious and other leaders condemn it,
sexual behavior, outside of married life, between
consenting adults is so common and so commonly
accepted by the society, that it is absurd to think that any
man in 1997 can be justified in believing that a woman
who engages in it is so degraded morally that she will
welcome his sexual advances without protest. Since a man
cannot seriously contend in 1997 that any woman who has
a sexual relationship with her co-worker is morally
degraded, justifying his conclusion that she will not resist
him, he is reduced to arguing that because a woman took
one co-worker as a lover he is justified in his belief that
she will accept him and welcome his sexual advances.
176
That, in all but his imagination, is non sequitur.
The scathing rebuttal continues throughout this opinion, with
the court sending a very clear signal that it will not tolerate this
177
construction of welcoming conduct.
175. E.g., Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D.D.C. 1997).
176. Id. at 52.
177. The expected effect of this opinion would be that parties in sexual
harassment disputes before this court had, from the date of this opinion, a definite
idea as to how potential claims of (un)welcome conduct would be viewed by this
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A similar but more succinct conclusion was reached in a
Minnesota case where the court of appeals found that the
employee’s “conversations with her female co-workers did not open
178
the door to sexual comments directed at her by her male boss.”
The employer’s owner and president had hugged and kissed his
employee in a back hallway; left a sexually explicit statue and a
magazine article depicting animal sexual positions on her desk;
described his son’s genitalia to her; implied that if she had an affair
with him, she could get a company car; and told her that he loved
179
her.
The employer argued unsuccessfully on appeal that the
conduct in question was not unwelcome, in part because the
employee had engaged in conversations of a sexual nature with
180
female co-workers.
To its credit, the Eighth Circuit appears to
have drawn the line at admitting into evidence only sexualized
181
behavior that occurred in the workplace.
d. Weighing Conflicts in the Evidence as Establishing
Welcomeness Per Se
Courts have determined disputed facts regarding
welcomeness, revealing a disposition toward recognizing a theory
of welcomeness per se: if she engaged in the conduct, she must
182
have welcomed it. These missteps by trial courts have often been
183
corrected on appeal.
The requirement that a plaintiff establish unwelcomeness,
particular judge.
178. Hansen v. Regency Corp., No. C6-95-962, 1996 WL 33116, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996).
179. Id. at *1.
180. Id. at *2.
181. See Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 801–02 (8th Cir. 2001)
(permitting evidence of sexual behavior that occurred in the workplace); Excel
Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 640–41 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming refusal to allow
evidence of sexual conduct that occurred away from work).
182. See Miles v. DDF, Inc., No. A03-1376, 2004 WL 1049286, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 11, 2004) (quoting trial court’s findings of fact on summary judgment,
which ignored the employee’s statement that she was threatened with the loss of
her job if she refused to engage in a sexual relationship with her boss and found
that her involvement in the planning of their sexual encounters negated her
testimony so “as to leave no doubt as to the factual truth” that she welcomed the
behavior). To its credit, the appellate court reversed because the trial court had
made improper credibility determinations. Id. at *5–6.
183. Id. at *5 (noting that the power disparity between the employee and her
boss may explain her acquiescence to conduct she claims was unwelcome;
reversing and remanding sexual harassment claim for trial).
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instead of requiring harassers to prove affirmatively that their
conduct was invited, has been stretched to support the argument
that any evidence that conflicts with the notion of unwelcomeness
requires a determination that the conduct was not unwelcome.
Thus, evidence that the plaintiff was friendly or that she eventually
submitted to the advances has been used as a basis for concluding
184
the plaintiff cannot establish unwelcomeness as a matter of law.
Such holdings represent a significant departure from the principle
that the existence of unwelcome conduct must be determined by
the finder of fact, based on the totality of the circumstances.
To its credit, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has mostly
resisted attempts to move the law in this direction, holding that
trial courts that use conflicting evidence to find against the
harassed employee have made improper credibility and factual
185
determinations concerning the issue of unwelcomeness.
In one
case, the trial court had viewed evidence of the employee’s
submission to a sexual relationship with her boss as so
overwhelmingly predominating in favor of the employer that
186
unwelcome conduct could not be established.
Disagreeing, the
appellate court noted “considerable deposition testimony” that her
boss’s initial overtures were not welcome: she had resisted his first
kiss, her boss said she would be fired if anyone found out about
their relationship, she objected to his touching and kissing, she
told him “no” and pushed him away before they had sex, and at
first she hated their sexual contacts, but put up with them just to
187
keep her job.
Allowing such conflicts in the evidence to be
resolved by the finder of fact is pivotal to the construction of
unwelcomeness as hinging upon context and determinations of
188
credibility.
184. See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1149 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting
district court’s ruling that plaintiff’s submission to sexual requests precluded a
finding of unwelcome conduct as a matter of law).
185. See Miles, 2004 WL 1049286, at *5 (reversing summary judgment for the
employer).
186. Id. at *4. The evidence included the employee’s acquisition of a hotel
room for the two of them, providing for drinks in the room, taking off her clothes
before her boss arrived, discussing their sexual relationship with friends and
coworkers, purchasing and exchanging gifts, arranging for their children to meet,
and discussing marriage and the possibility of operating the company together.
Id. at *1–2.
187. Id. at *4.
188. See also Petrovic v. Ridgeview Country Club, No. C6-01-1474, 2002 WL
765490, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (reversing judgment that conduct
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Conversely, the appellate court has rejected efforts by
defendants to appeal findings of unwelcome conduct, following a
trial, based on allegedly conflicting friendly or receptive behavior
on the part of the plaintiff. In one instance, the court upheld a
determination that conduct was unwelcome despite the existence
189
of some indications of welcomeness.
Evidence presented at trial
that the employee had made meals for the employer, discussed her
personal life, and sent him love letters after she quit “may conflict
190
with but does not rebut the prima facie case.” Similarly, the court
of appeals upheld a finding that conduct was unwelcome over
defendant’s claim that inconsistencies and the cards she sent to
191
him and signed “love” proved otherwise.
In a recent departure from this stance, however, the appellate
court upheld a finding that an employee’s allegedly conflicting
response to harassing conduct precluded her from establishing
192
unwelcomeness as a matter of law.
The employee argued that a
factfinder should resolve the issue, asserting that her rejection of
the harasser’s invitation for a Las Vegas trip, her complaints
concerning that proposal and a suggestive note he sent, her refusal
to share meals with him, and “her demeanor and disposition”
193
would establish that the conduct was unwelcome.
The appellate
court refused to allow her to present this evidence, citing her offer
of a two-block ride after a party, acceptance of candy bars, e-mail
stating that she “could never be ‘mad’ at” him, and a note

was not unwelcome as a matter of law because the employee had continued to
work at parties where claimed harassment occurred, and holding that trial court
had engaged in improper determination of disputed fact of unwelcomeness).
189. Schurstein v. Selmer Law Firm, P.A., No. C9-99-530, 1999 WL 732438, at
*1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1999) (holding that it was not clearly erroneous for
the trial court to find that the employer had sexually harassed his employee by
making advances, threatening termination when she tried to avoid his phone calls,
going to her apartment the day after terminating her and initiating sex, and
rehiring her after that, conditional on her writing a thank you note for her job).
190. Id. at *2.
191. B.L.L. v. Estate of Heller, No. C0-98-1359, 1998 WL 901757, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1998) (noting that her trial testimony indicated that she told the
employer his overtures “were ‘not right,’” tried to avoid his physical advances, and
changed the subject when he made sexual comments).
192. Monson v. N. Habilitative Servs., No. A05-1102, 2006 WL 771919, at *1, *6
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006) (upholding summary judgment for the employer).
193. Id. at *6. In addition, she had refused his offer of help getting on her
coat until the two “were engaged in a ‘tug of war,’” resisted his attempt to hold her
physically and help her cross an icy walkway, and told him she was not interested
in going to Las Vegas with him. Id. at *1.
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including a smiley face to politely decline his offer of food. Based
on these facts, the appellate court held that her claim of
unwelcome conduct was “not substantiated by any outward
195
manifestations of such an attitude.”
If followed, this newer interpretation of the unwelcomeness
element as impossible to establish where there is some indication
that the conduct was welcome retreats from the goal of enabling
plaintiffs to establish unwelcome conduct by presenting the facts
contextually. Particularly where such alleged conflicts are merely
friendly, as opposed to sexually tinged, behavior, this standard
facilitates continued inequality by converting courtesy and social
196
graces into an invitation for sexual advances.
Women who adhere to their gender roles by being nice, loyal,
197
can be viewed as having welcomed sexual
and nurturing
harassment.
This interpretation hinders efforts to rid the
workplace of harassment by preventing valid claims from moving
forward. Behavioral studies show that women are unlikely to
behave confrontationally when harassed, but instead attempt to
198
tolerate or ignore the conduct.
Such a requirement for
establishing unwelcomeness contradicts typical behavior by seeking
evidence that the employee outwardly expressed unfriendliness.
Evidence that conduct was not unwelcome is frequently
gleaned from the woman’s treatment of the harasser, with signs of
friendship, openness, or even ambivalence about the relationship
interpreted as welcoming sexual overtures. Courts have considered
the fact that a woman frequently had lunch with a supervisor and
“discussed personal matters” as constituting evidence that sexual
199
advances were not unwelcome.
194. Id. at *6.
195. Id. at *7.
196. See Weiner, supra note 74, at 630 (noting cases where courts have found “a
woman’s having lunch with a man, visiting a man in the hospital, and kissing a
man on the cheek in a posed snapshot relevant to the question of whether a
woman has invited subsequent harassment and even attempted sexual assault”).
197. See Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and
Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 55, 58–59 (1982). In an
effort to obtain or preserve social acceptance, women typically fulfill the
stereotypical female role. Id.
198. See, e.g., Gruber & Smith, supra note 151, at 544–46 (citing studies
concluding that most women do not respond assertively to or formally report
harassment, but that instead they incorporate various strategies for tolerating it).
199. See Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). Other
evidence relied on by the trial and reviewing courts, including that the employee
wrote a note struggling to define their relationship as involving love or mere
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In addition, a woman who does not convey a requisite level of
shock at the harassing conduct may be deemed to have
experienced conduct that is not unwelcome. One Minnesota court
found that a woman who managed to retain her composure in the
face of harassment, instead of outwardly expressing shock or
200
horror, had not experienced unwelcome conduct.
The trial
court found that her “comments evinced a sense of humor and
perspective about the parties that belied her claim of sexual
201
harassment.”
Some courts have interpreted this requirement as necessitating
that the harassed employee made some very clear response, after
202
the fact, to inform the harasser that the conduct was not wanted.
The state agency in charge of investigating discriminatory
203
employment practices also appears to countenance this idea.
e. Claims of Unwelcome Conduct as Mere Remorse or
Ambivalence
Several Minnesota decisions interject the notion that some
sexual harassment claims are merely based on misgivings over what,
204
at the time, were welcome advances. This line of thinking brings
with it the underlying mythology that there is a prevalence of
fraudulent sexual harassment claims. In Miles v. DDF, Inc., a
woman who claimed she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
advances from her boss was found to have been a “willing and
active participant” in sexual conduct, and her claim was found to
be based on regret and her likely honest belief that she had been

friendship, shows less of a non-progressive bias. Id. at 766.
200. Petrovic v. Ridgeview Country Club, No. C6-01-1474, 2002 WL 765490
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002).
201. Id. at *3.
202. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 516 (1994) (discussing Dockter v. Rudolf
Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990)).
203. See Klinghagen v. Setterberg, Nos. C6-97-1744, CX-97-1293, 1998 WL
249028, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 1998) (noting that, according to the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights, unwelcomeness was unlikely to be
established because the employee did not let the harasser know his conduct was
unwelcome).
204. See Bernstein, supra note 83, at 500 (stating that “as many commentators
argue, the rule about ‘welcomeness’ is akin to the common law belief that rape
claims are often lies that are asserted to nullify past consent: according to the
prejudice, a woman who is now a plaintiff or a prosecutrix was a willing participant
when the conduct occurred”).
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205

taken advantage of.
The implication, left unstated, is that her
testimony that the advances were unwelcome was in fact dishonest.
Omitted is an analysis of whether what she regretted was really her
206
acquiescence to her boss’s uninvited and unwelcome advances.
In another case where the plaintiff was found unable to establish
unwelcome conduct, the court characterized the plaintiff as
207
considering the advances “unwelcome in retrospect.”
A second theme that should also be noted is the notion that
the harassed employee’s mixed or ambivalent feelings about the
harasser preclude a finding of unwelcomeness. One Minnesota
court was comfortable affirming a finding that no sexual
harassment occurred because the evidence indicated that either
the employee welcomed her supervisor’s advances, or she had
208
“ambivalent feelings” about them.
More progressive developments in the law would find that an
employee who is ambivalent about sexual conduct in the workplace
has not sufficiently invited or solicited the conduct for it to be
deemed welcome. Determinations of whether particular conduct
was unwelcome would not devolve into speculation about whether
the claim was brought because an employee now regretted being
taken advantage of by her boss.
2. Complaint as the Sine Qua Non – Behavioral Assumptions Not
Borne Out by Research
Although an employee is not required to complain about the
conduct in order to establish that sexual harassment has
209
assessment of unwelcomeness in the courts is
occurred,
frequently tied to whether the employee complained and, if so, to

205. No. EM 02-20129, 2004 WL 3563777, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30,
2004).
206. Id.
207. Halvorson v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 011774RHKAJB, 2002 WL
31371938, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2002).
208. Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
209. However, where an employer provides an internal complaint process, an
employee may be required to attempt to use it in order to impose liability on the
employer. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment –
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and BisomRapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 170–71, 175 (criticizing the affirmative
defense recognized by the Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) where
an employee does not use an employer’s internal complaint procedures).
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210

whom.
An additional assumption, often affirmed in the law, is
that if conduct is truly unwelcome, the complaint will be made in a
211
direct manner using formal procedures.
Failure to complain,
212
complaining long after the harassing events have occurred, or
213
raising the issue in an indirect manner are thus considered
evidence that the conduct was welcome.
Women, however, usually do not complain when they
214
experience sexual harassment at work.
Additionally, the racial
status and cultural background of the parties involved may make it
215
less likely that the woman will complain.
Minnesota courts show signs of clinging tightly to the notion
that if the conduct was truly unwelcome, the employee would have
formally complained to the employer. In one case, an intern
asserted that her supervisor was harassing her by commenting on
how she looked in a sweater, by physically attacking her while they
were at her house for lunch, and by engaging in “mutual kissing
216
and petting.” The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict
210. See Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding that when plaintiff failed to complain about the conduct, it was not
determined to be unwelcome); Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 100–01 (“[M]aking a
formal complaint appears to be the legal sine qua non of an ‘appropriate’
response.”).
211. See, e.g., Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (S.D.
Fla. 2002). (determining that conduct was not unwelcome in part because
complaint was made informally, to a co-worker, and that initial, more formal
discussions with management left out certain details); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (providing that conduct was
not unwelcome in part because plaintiff reported harassment in casual
conversation with supervisor), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991); Kouri v. Liber.
Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-00582-A, 1991 WL 50003, at *7–8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 1991)
(noting that plaintiff failed to report harassment through formal channels), aff’d,
960 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
212. See Paraohao, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (finding that conduct was not
unwelcome as a matter of law in part because the plaintiff did not complain until
nearly four months after she started working with the harasser); Weinsheimer, 754 F.
Supp. at 1564 (finding that conduct was not unwelcome where reported months
afterwards); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 608 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding
that a three-month delay in reporting did not support actionable harassment).
213. See Weinsheimer, 754 F. Supp. at 1564 (focusing on the delay and the fact
that plaintiff reported the harassment via informal conversations with supervisors
without appearing troubled).
214. Marshall, supra note 151, at 86 (citing numerous articles and studies
finding that women tend to refrain from complaining about sexual harassment).
215. Crenshaw, supra note 82, at 421–22, 424–27 (stating that the camaraderie
grounded in a shared history of social exclusion “make[s] many black women
reluctant to complain about or even to decisively reject the [black] harasser”).
216. Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 766–68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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for the defendant employer, noting in part that the woman had
only complained about her supervisor’s conduct to another intern
217
and to her daughter.
Although there was other evidence impacting the
218
the
determination of whether the conduct was unwelcome,
appellate court focused on the intern’s failure to complain, noting
that this intern showed signs of being quite assertive in other
aspects of her life, with no empathy for how experiencing sexual
harassment in the context of a career path might create different
219
barriers to reporting.
In the end, the appellate court stated
“[t]he logical conclusion is that [the intern] did not complain
because either the advances were welcome, or at least she had
220
ambivalent feelings.” Here, the court’s opinion actually requires
the intern to overcome a presumption that having mixed feelings
about her supervisor necessarily translated into welcoming his
221
sexual advances.
Even where a decision is sympathetic to the idea that women
who have been harassed at work do not always formally complain,
traces of the inclination to favor those who report over those who
do not remain. In one instance, an employer argued that a finding
of unwelcome conduct, where the employee had not formally
222
complained, should be overturned on appeal.
The appellate
court deferred to the findings of fact made by the trial court, which
found that, among other things, the employee believed that
ignoring her boss’s behavior communicated that the conduct was
223
not welcome.
In upholding the judgment of harassment,
however, the appellate court also placed significance on the fact
that the employee later directly told her boss that she was not being
224
paid to tolerate his harassment.
Favoring complainers over non217. Id. at 768.
218. Other facts supporting the trial court’s decision included the two having
lunch together frequently and discussing personal issues, the intern writing her
supervisor a note expressing affection for him and reservations about the fact that
he was married, the two having several kissing and petting sessions, and that the
intern selected this internship knowing that this particular man would be her
supervisor. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. This attitude resonates with the theme of regret noted above.
222. Hansen v. Regency Corp., No. C6-95-962, 1996 WL 33116, at *1–2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996).
223. Id. at *2.
224. Id. at *1.
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complainers in determining whether conduct qualifies as
unwelcome places the majority of female employees at a
disadvantage in establishing sexual harassment.
The idea that real harassment always prompts complaints
about the conduct is so entrenched that courts have pondered
whether establishing unwelcomeness requires repeated reports
225
when the conduct continues to occur.
Even the rare female
employee who repeatedly complains about ongoing harassment is
rewarded, not with a determination that the conduct was
unwelcome as a matter of law, but with the opportunity to present
226
Employees who do not have the social or
her case to a jury.
financial wherewithal to complain, confront, or quit would
presumably receive a less favorable decision.
In only one instance did a court express doubts about the
validity of the presumption that women complain when conduct is
227
unwelcome.
In that case, the employee never told her
supervisors that their conduct was unwelcome, but instead
responded to their behavior with silence, terse disapproval, or
228
blushing. In holding that the issue of unwelcomeness was clearly
one of fact and denying the employer’s request for judgment as a
matter of law, the court noted that she may have refrained from
complaining as a result of the power disparity between herself, a
secretary, and the harassers, who were high-level administrators for
229
her employer.
Progressive treatment of unwelcomeness should
reveal, at a minimum, this level of awareness.
A truly progressive interpretation would incorporate
developments in the understanding of women’s behavior by
225. Hansen v. Genuine Parts Co., No. CIV.00-16DWFAJB, 2001 WL 586722, at
*4 (D. Minn. May 29, 2001) (fleeting analysis of whether plaintiff had to keep
complaining in order to establish unwelcomeness; plaintiff survived summary
judgment; a jury should determine whether failing to continue reporting specific
incidents was reasonable in light of the employer’s lack of response to her initial
complaints).
226. Myers v. State, No. C4-99-855, 2000 WL 2620, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
2000). In reversing summary judgment, the evidence that impressed the court as
demonstrating that the conduct was unwelcome was the employee’s repeated oral
complaints about the conduct, negative reactions to harassing co-workers, and
ultimate resignation from the job. Id.
227. Dull v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Duluth, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024 (D. Minn.
1998). The employer sought summary judgment, alleging among other things that
the employee had failed to signal that the conduct of her bosses was unwelcome.
Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1025.
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discounting or discarding the notion that a formal, timely
complaint is the best evidence of unwelcomeness or that the lack of
a complaint shows that conduct was welcome. The state and
federal courts of Minnesota have not produced opinions that
promote much, if any, progress in this area.
IV. CONCLUSION
A progressive agenda as to the element of unwelcome conduct
is not hard to articulate: outdated insinuations about what it means
when women work outside the home and how women should
behave with regard to sexuality should be rejected.
The
descending hierarchy of protection from workplace harassment, in
which women who are more sexually expressive or experienced are
less entitled to object to harassment, should be eliminated.
Evidentiary presumptions based on long-since debunked theories
about how women react to sexual harassment should be set aside
and replaced with an interpretation of unwelcome conduct that
requires more from the defendant and less from the plaintiff.
Minnesota courts have not been as proactive as they could be
in identifying and criticizing efforts to infuse the unwelcomeness
inquiry with outdated stereotypes and assumptions about proper
female sexual behavior. Drawing the lines more clearly would
provide complaining employees with more basis for assessing the
230
risk of enduring “a second rape” and force defendants to rethink
efforts to play on bias and sexism to embarrass the plaintiff and win
over the finder of fact. Although the analysis will continue to be
conducted on a case-by-case basis, explicit warnings from courts are
needed to guide the conduct of the parties, the advice of counsel,
and to otherwise create a framework of expectations as to how
these aspects of human behavior will be treated by today’s courts.
Such efforts comport with the progressive agenda of improving
access to justice for those who tend to be underrepresented and
disempowered by the legal system and, ultimately, of changing the
underlying societal attitudes to promote social justice.

230. See MADIGAN & GAMBLE, supra note 105, at 3 (analyzing the ways in which
“women who report rape are again raped by a system composed of wellintentioned people who are nevertheless blinded by the myths of centuries”).
Sexual harassment litigation has permitted similar abuses of civil complainants.
Id.
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